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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal concerns whether the district court 
appropriately construed the terms of a consent decree 
entered into by the City of Philadelphia and various related 
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officials (collectively, the "City") and the plaintiff-appellee 
class (the "Plaintiffs") consisting of all present and future 
inmates in the Philadelphia Prison System. The decree 
resolved the Plaintiffs' civil rights action alleging 
unconstitutional overcrowding in the prison system. The 
City agreed, inter alia, to develop a management 
information services (MIS) plan for tracking the inmate 
population and to fulfill specified aspects of the plan by 
certain deadlines. Subsequently, on January 6, 1997, the 
district court issued an amended order (the "Amended 
Order") requiring the City to undertake and achieve certain 
performance goals relating to the MIS plan by various 
deadlines or face the imposition of fines. The City contends 
that the parties never agreed to these additional terms and 
that the Amended Order modifies and expands the decree 
beyond what the parties agreed to in the consent decree. 
We agree with the City and will vacate the Amended Order. 
 
I. 
 
A group of inmates filed a class action suit in 1982 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1988 claiming violations 
of the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
because of alleged overcrowding at Holmesburg Prison. An 
amended complaint filed in 1983 asserted claims pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for alleged constitutional deprivation 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
plaintiff class later grew to include all present and future 
inmates in the Philadelphia Prison System, and the suit 
expanded to encompass the entire prison system. In 1986, 
after extensive negotiation, the City and the Plaintiffs 
entered into a settlement in which the Plaintiffs 
relinquished their claims for damages in return for various 
undertakings by the City. For example, the agreement 
required the City to construct a 440-bed detention facility 
in downtown Philadelphia by December 31, 1990, and to 
release inmates according to certain procedures if the 
inmate population exceeded a maximum allowable figure. 
The district court approved the settlement and entered a 
consent order on December 30, 1986 (the "1986 Consent 
Decree"). 
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By 1989, it became evident that the 440-bed facility 
would not be available by the agreed upon date. In 
response, the City and the Plaintiffs negotiated an 
agreement designed to alleviate overcrowding in the interim 
but did not secure the district court's approval of this 
agreement. Consequently, the Plaintiffs filed a motion in 
February of 1990 to vacate the 1986 Consent Decree and 
reinstate their amended complaint. The City opposed the 
motion. In August of 1990, the Plaintiffs moved for 
emergency relief from the continued overcrowding, and, in 
its response, the City expressed approval of the relief 
requested. Further negotiation led the parties to enter into 
a new and more detailed agreement in 1991 culminating in 
another consent order (the "1991 Consent Decree"). Among 
other items, the 1991 Consent Decree requires the City to 
engage in a Prison Planning Process addressing the 
physical plant of the prison system as well as its operation. 
This process entails development of population projections, 
a population management plan, physical and operational 
standards, a capital projects management plan, an 
operational management plan, and a management 
information services plan. 
 
This appeal chiefly concerns the MIS plan. The relevant 
section of the 1991 Consent Decree provides: 
 
        F. Management Information Services Plan. The 
       defendants shall develop a plan to provide management 
       information systems (both manual and electronic as 
       necessary) to support and perform all actions called for 
       in paragraphs "A" through "E," above. To this end, the 
       defendants shall develop a strategic systems plan that 
       identifies what information is needed and how it will be 
       managed to support and perform the requirements of 
       this Agreement. 
 
        The defendants shall achieve compliance with 
       paragraphs "A" through "F " by performing the 
       activities set forth on the attached Exhibit "A", 
       consisting of three (3) numbered pages and seven (7) 
       unnumbered pages, by each of the dates specified 
       therein. Exhibit "A" is incorporated herein by reference 
       as part of this Appendix and also as a part of the 
       agreement of the parties. 
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App. at 262. Exhibit "A" lists the following activities 
pertinent to the MIS plan and their corresponding 
deadlines: 
 
       F  Management Information Services Plan 
 
       F1 Develop a MIS to support all activities 
 
       Write scope of services for MIS development 
       contract 
       Establish Criminal Justice Management 
       Information System Manager 
       Establish Criminal Justice System Information 
       Board 
       Hire MIS Consultant 
       Develop Board Policies 
       Develop Data System Definitions 
       Identify Application and Equipment Needs 
       Identify and Implement Short-term Needs 
       Draft Criminal Justice MIS Plan 
       Develop Implementation Schedule 
 
App. at 272. 
 
During a status conference concerning the MIS plan on 
November 6, 1996, the district court proposed entry of an 
order imposing deadlines for the implementation of the MIS 
plan and requiring various other performances by the City 
under penalty of fines. The City objected to such an order. 
At another conference on November 20, 1996, the district 
court again suggested the appropriateness of such an 
order, and the City again objected. Despite the objection, 
the district court sua sponte entered the Amended Order on 
January 6, 1997.1 It requires the City to (i) meet deadlines 
for implementation of the MIS plan under penalty offines, 
(ii) complete a "clean-up" of the computer database used to 
track inmates by a certain date, (iii) conduct monthly 
audits of the database, and (iv) pay fines for errors in the 
database that exceed an error rate of five percent. This 
appeal followed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Amended Order superseded the district court's order of December 
6, 1996, but contained substantially the same terms. 
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II. 
 
The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. The Amended Order is final and 
immediately appealable because, as discussed herein, it 
modified the 1991 Consent Decree thereby establishing the 
parties' rights and obligations. See United States v. 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d 
Cir. 1987). Since consent decrees have the attributes of 
contracts voluntarily undertaken, we exercise plenary 
review over a district court's construction of a consent 
decree. See Fox v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 680 F.2d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 
III. 
 
We discern the scope of a consent decree by examining 
the language within its four corners. See United States v. 
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82, 91 S. Ct. 1752, 1757 
(1971). In so doing, we must not strain the decree's precise 
terms or impose other terms in an attempt to reconcile the 
decree with our own conception of its purpose. See id. A 
consent decree is the product of negotiation between the 
parties and embodies a compromise struck among various 
factors, including the parties' competing goals and the time, 
expense, and risk of litigation. See id. "[T]he decree itself 
cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have 
purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the 
resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing 
purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining 
power and skill to achieve." Id. (footnote omitted). By 
consenting to a decree, a defendant waives the right under 
the Due Process Clause to litigate the issues raised by the 
plaintiff 's complaint. See id. at 682, 91 S. Ct. at 1757. A 
court should not later modify the decree by interposing 
terms not agreed to by the parties or not included in the 
language of the decree. See United States v. Atlantic Ref. 
Co., 360 U.S. 19, 23, 79 S. Ct. 944, 946 (1959); Hughes v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 353, 357, 72 S. Ct. 306, 308 
(1952). 
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A. 
 
The district court's Amended Order is an attempt to 
effectuate its conception of the purpose of the 1991 
Consent Decree. The district court did not fully articulate 
its conception of that purpose. Nevertheless, it is manifest 
from the Amended Order that the district court concluded 
that the City should not only develop the MIS plan and 
certain components thereof but also implement the MIS 
plan to a satisfactory degree of operation by a certain date 
subject to fines. While laudable from an efficiency or social 
policy perspective, the Amended Order runs afoul of the 
well-settled law on construing consent decrees. 
 
As the language of the decree reveals, the additional 
requirements imposed in the Amended Order cannot be 
found anywhere within the four corners of the 1991 
Consent Decree. In that consent decree, the City agreed to 
"develop a plan to provide management information 
systems (both manual and electronic as necessary) to 
support and perform all actions called for" in other plans in 
the Prison Planning Process. App. at 262. Moreover, the 
City agreed to "develop a strategic systems plan that 
identifies what information is needed and how it will be 
managed to support and perform the requirements of this 
Agreement." Id. It also agreed to perform "the activities set 
forth on the attached Exhibit `A'[.]" Id. 
 
Nothing in this language or the activities listed in Exhibit 
"A" indicates an agreement by the parties that the City will 
comply with the requirements eventually imposed in the 
Amended Order. For example, one of the activities listed in 
Exhibit "A" is to "Develop [an] Implementation Schedule" for 
the MIS plan. App. at 272. However unfortunate an 
outcome, agreeing to develop an implementation schedule 
for the MIS plan or a "strategic systems plan" is not the 
same as agreeing to implement the schedule or the plan. 
The City never agreed to implement the MIS plan by a 
certain date under penalty of fines. Nor did the City agree 
to submit to monthly audits, to "clean-up" its database 
once developed, or to achieve a certain level of accuracy in 
its database on an ongoing basis. Indeed, the Amended 
Order appears to subject the City's data entry employees to 
perpetual oversight by the district court -- a situation not 
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contemplated by the parties in the agreement. We can 
appreciate the district court's frustration with the delays in 
implementing the MIS plan and in bringing these matters to 
a close, but we must conclude that the 1991 Consent 
Decree does not provide the authority for the district court 
to proceed in this manner. 
 
B. 
 
In support of the Amended Order, the Plaintiffs 
emphasize that the 1991 Consent Decree "provides for 
sanctions should the City fail to implement the mandated 
plans." Appellee's Br. at 6. However, it is more accurate to 
state that the decree allows for fines should the City fail to 
comply with certain plan milestones. Paragraph 27 of the 
decree states, "Defendants shall be subject to a penalty of 
$500.00 per day for each day of delay in complying with or 
fulfilling a plan milestone . . . ." App. at 250. The City only 
agreed to pay fines for its failure to submit certain aspects 
of the MIS plan, and the milestones referenced in 
Paragraph 27 do not include the requirements imposed in 
the Amended Order. The Plaintiffs also argue that 
Paragraph 23 of the decree authorizes the district court to 
impose deadlines, backed by fines, for implementation of 
the MIS plan. Paragraph 23 states, "Once a plan is 
approved by the Court, defendants shall carry it out, 
subject to the penalties set forth in Paragraph 27." App. at 
248. Nothing in this language, however, evidences an 
agreement by the City to implement the MIS plan, as 
opposed to complying with specified plan milestones, by a 
certain date subject to fines. In sum, paragraphs 27 and 23 
do not demonstrate any agreement by the City to 
implement the MIS plan by a certain deadline under 
penalty of fines. 
 
Plaintiffs also argue that the district court's Trust 
Indenture powers provide the requisite authority to issue 
the Amended Order. The Trust Indenture empowers the 
district court to approve contracts funded by certain bond 
money. The relevant language provides that "all contracts 
for the construction of the Detention Facility and the 
Criminal Justice Center . . . must be approved by the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania prior 
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to their award." App. at 309-10. To be sure, the City 
contracted with a third party to create the database and 
supply the necessary hardware to effectuate the MIS plan. 
Nevertheless, the power to approve this and other contracts 
does not include the power to impose certain deadlines, 
require audits, set error rate requirements, or impose fines 
related to the MIS plan. We conclude that the Trust 
Indenture does not authorize the district court to impose 
the requirements and fines set forth in the Amended Order. 
 
Finally, the Plaintiffs attempt to construe the Amended 
Order as an exercise of the district court's power to fashion 
sanctions pursuant to Paragraph 30 of the decree. That 
provision states, "Nothing herein is intended to restrict the 
Court's authority to issue contempt citations or its power 
under the All Writs Act." App. at 251. Paragraphs 24 
through 26 provide for a procedure whereby a Special 
Master will monitor and report on the City's compliance 
with the consent decree. The parties may request a hearing 
before the Special Master and subsequently the district 
court to resolve issues that remain in dispute. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that this procedure was 
followed in this case. There has been no finding by anyone 
of a lack of substantial compliance by the City, and the 
district court has not conducted any contempt hearing. To 
the extent that the Amended Order foreshadowed or 
signaled the sanctions that the district court would impose 
if the City was found not to be in substantial compliance, 
it placed the cart before the horse. We conclude that the 
Amended Order cannot be justified as remedying a lack of 
compliance or as an exercise of the district court's 
contempt powers. 
 
IV. 
 
The district court's Amended Order of January 6, 1997, 
modified the parties' agreement as embodied in the 1991 
Consent Decree and imposed terms not agreed to by the 
parties. We will vacate the Amended Order and remand for 
further administration of the consent decree consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
Each party to bear its own costs. 
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